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The Free Transportation Safe Harbor Misses the Boat: Why Social Determinants of Health 
and Value-Based Payments Should Influence the Anti-Kickback Statute  
 
I. Introduction 
The United States has a lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, and higher 
prevalence of chronic disease than most developed countries.1   One potential reason for these 
discrepancies is that while the country spends exorbitantly on health care, it allocates minimal 
resources to social services.2  Social factors, like socio-economic status, the environment, and 
employment status account for approximately 1/3 of U.S. deaths.3  Research has shown that these 
social determinants of health (SDH)4, which include factors like access to transportation, need to 
be addressed through investment in broad population-based approaches in order to drive positive 
health change.5 Nations that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development spend about $1.70, on average, on social services for every $1 on health services; 
the U.S. spends only 56 cents.6 While health care services are  essential to positively impacting 
overall health status,7 only through addressing the SDH can the U.S. achieve health equity.8 
Currently, efforts to target these activities can be seen within the health care system, as payment 
reform initiatives increase their focus on the SDH.9  
                                                          
1 Thomas L. Greaney, Medicare Advantage, Accountable Care Organizations, and Traditional Medicare: 
Synchronization or Collision?, 15 Yale J. of Health Pol’y, Law, and Ethics 37, 39 (2015). 
2 Id. 
3 Harry J. Heiman & Samantha Artiga, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in Promoting Health 
and Health Equity, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured at 8 (Nov. 2015), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-beyond-health-care; E.H. Bradley, H. Sipsma & L.A. Taylor, American 
Health Care Paradox—High Spending on Health Care and Poor Health, 110 Q. J. of Med. 62, 69 (2017) (as income 
goes down, rates of premature death increase). 
4 Bradley, supra note 3, at 69. 
5 Id. at 62. 
6  Stuart M Butler, Dayna Bowen Matthew, & Marcela Cabello, Re-balancing medical and social spending to 
promote health: Increasing state flexibility to improve health through housing, USC-Brookings Schaeffer on Health 
Policy (Feb. 15, 2017), http://brook.gs/2lLn7BB. 
7 Heiman, supra note 3, at 1. 
8 Id.at 3 (health equity is defined as the highest level of health for all people). 
9 Id. at 5. 
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The importance of SDH in driving health care delivery and payment reforms can be seen 
across the country.10 One example is the State Innovation Models Initiative (SIM), which is led by 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovations.11 SIM seeks to develop multi-payer models 
that improve overall health system performance, quality, and costs through the emphasis on 
establishing linkages between primary care and community-based organizations and social 
services.12 The core strategy of SIM is to ensure that health care focuses on the  person as a whole, 
which includes not only health care, but social and environmental factors as well.13 Similarly, 
Medicaid has expressed that its delivery and payment reform initiatives will include a focus on 
linking health care and social needs.14 In order for population health improvements and cost-
reductions to be realized, the U.S. health care system needs to focus on integration and 
coordination of services across providers and settings, including the means to connect people to 
social supports.15 
Unfortunately, laws targeting health care fraud, like the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), 
were developed through a fee-for-service (FFS) lens, which inhibits the ability of providers to 
embrace modern payment models. Under FFS, providers seek to maximize the volume of their 
services in order to increase their profits.16  The AKS was founded on the notion that the payment 
structure of FFS created incentives for providers to behave in potentially fraudulent ways.17 Since 
its inception, the AKS has not undergone any significant transformations to reflect changes in 
                                                          
10 See id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 5-6. 
13 Id. at 6. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and 
Abuse Enforcement, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 239, 251 (Fall 1999). 
17 Id.at 250. 
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health care payment structure.18 Innovation therefore has been stifled, particularly in the realm of 
SDH.  One potential solution is to afford providers more leeway in business practices that target 
SDH through appropriate AKS safe harbors.19  
The Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) recognizes that 
AKS enforcement may require more liberal discretion to meet the demands of the dynamic U.S. 
Health Care System, in particular through the implementation of safe harbors to protect beneficial 
programs or services from prosecution.20  By expanding its scope beyond the limitations of FFS 
and into the realm of alternative health payment models that target the SDH, OIG will be able to 
improve health care access and generate widespread health improvements across at-risk 
populations.  In addition, the move to value-based systems allows for services that target SDH to 
be implemented without increasing incidents of fraud and abuse, as the dangers inherent in FFS21 
are not present when payments are based on quality of care, not quantity. 
This paper employs the Free Transportation Safe Harbor as an analytical vehicle to 
demonstrate that Federal Health Care Programs would actually benefit by allowing broader 
experimentation by providers to enable access to care.  Part II presents a brief case study to frame 
the issue between SDH, the AKS, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).  The 
case study is followed by an overview of the health care payment system in the United States, with 
specific emphasis on the move from predominantly fee-for-service into a value based system, the 
recognition that social barriers can interfere with healthcare access, and the ramifications of 
                                                          
18 See Rebecca C. Martin & Tony Maida, Affordable Care Act Repeal and Impact on False Claims Act Liability and 
Defenses, AHLA Weekly (Dec. 9, 2016) (the ACA amended the AKS to allow False Claims Act actions to be brought 
through the AKS, and amended the scienter requirement, but did not change AKS’ response to payment 
structures).   
19 Safe harbors are provisions in an agreement, law, or regulation that afford protection from liability or penalty 
under specified circumstances or if certain conditions are met.  Safe Harbor, Business Dictionary, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/safe-harbor.html. 
20 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368, 88,370. 
21 One risk in FFS is increased rates of unnecessary procedures or services. 
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attempts to update the healthcare and reimbursement systems for AKS enforcement.  Part III 
examines the prevalence of fraud and abuse in the United States and how the AKS acts to police 
violators, while still attempting to allow “valuable” practices to escape enforcement.  Part IV 
focuses on the development of the Free Transportation Safe Harbor, and juxtaposes the original 
intent of the AKS with the new policy recommendations of the Affordable Care Act.  Part V 
provides potential solutions to the tension between the ACA and AKS via modifications to the 
existing Free Transportation Safe Harbor. A brief conclusion follows. 
II. Changes in Health Care Payment Theory 
A. A Case Study 
Jane Smith is a 23-year-old woman who is homeless but staying with a friend in a low-
income area of one of the largest urban cities in the northeast.  She works for minimum wage at a 
fast food restaurant a few blocks from where she resides, trying to save enough money to move 
into her own place.  Her employer does not provide health insurance, but she is enrolled in 
Medicaid. Nonetheless, Jane rarely accesses a physician due to transportation barriers.  Recently 
Jane found out she was pregnant and her friends advised her to go to a clinic, but she is not sure 
where to turn.  One day on her walk to work, Jane saw a flyer from a local health care system 
advertising that it provided transportation to its clinic for those in need. Jane called the number to 
schedule her first prenatal visit.  The clinic sent a standard passenger van to pick up Jane for her 
appointment.  During her visit with the physician Jane learned that a social service agency across 
town helps place indigent persons in affordable housing.  The clinic offered her transport to the 
facility.  As a result of the intervention, Jane was able to make all of her necessary prenatal visits 
and secure modest housing.  Her little girl was born healthy and happy. 
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Unfortunately, under the AKS, the above scenario could never happen as it violates 
numerous aspects of the statute.22 Two specific factors illustrate the problem.  First, the health care 
system is not allowed to use advertisement or marketing strategies to recruit patients,23 especially 
those patients who are not established within their system.24  Second, the government treats the 
offer of transportation to access non-medically necessary services, like housing, as impermissible 
remuneration under the statute.25  These two factors mean the health care system could face 
punishment under the AKS, which includes facing fines, imprisonment, and also potential to be 
barred from Federal Health Care Programs like Medicare and Medicaid.26  As a result, Jane would 
likely have never accessed health care for her pregnancy until she was admitted to the hospital, 
likely through an emergency department, to deliver. Further, the odds that her delivery would be 
high-risk are great given the lack of prenatal care, her low-income status, and stressful housing 
situation.27 It is therefore likely that Jane’s total costs for her childbirth would be significantly 
higher to the Medicaid program than if the transportation service would have simply been 
available. 
The above scenario illustrates the dichotomy between the AKS and the ACA goals.  Under 
the AKS, the government seeks to control situations that increase costs to Federal Health Care 
Programs. For example, it controls providers forgoing their medical judgment in exchange for 
increased referrals, which would result in increased income for the provider as well as the 
possibility of unnecessary or inferior care.28  The triple aims of the ACA seek to promote access 
                                                          
22 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (2018). 
23 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368, 88,386-87. 
24 Id. at 88,381-82. 
25 Id. at 88,384. 
26 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (2018). 
27 See Anthony M. Vintzileos et. al., The impact of prenatal care in the United States on preterm births in the 
presence and absence of antenatal high-risk conditions, 187 Am. J. Obstetrics and Gynecology 1254 (2002). 
28 James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care 
Speakeasy, 22 Am. J. L. and Med. 205, 208 (1996). 
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to care and increased quality to drive health care costs lower and produce healthier people.29 The 
tension between these two laws arises due to the payment systems and structures employed in U.S. 
health care and the failure of Congress and HHS to take measures proactively to implement 
appropriate provisions recognizing that health care fraud and reimbursement practices are 
changing.   As the FFS system is phased out in favor of value-based payments, the principles of 
the ACA should receive additional emphasis. If this were to happen, situations like Jane’s could 
result in an overall increase in health and a potential reduction in Federal Health Care Program 
spending,30 all without increasing the risk of fraud.31 
B. The Shift from Fee for Service to Value-Based Payments 
 Health care in the United States has historically been reimbursed on a FFS basis either by 
patients themselves, or third-party payors.32 Under FFS, payers pay providers for each service 
performed, rather than on their quality or efficiency of care.33 Under normal economic conditions, 
the FFS model would be appropriate.34 However, in the health care setting, the combination of 
financial rewards based on quantity, not quality, combined with higher reimbursement for more 
complex procedures, leads to an inefficient system that frankly incentivizes abuse.35  Providers 
seek to maximize both the volume of the services they offer, and to utilize the highest 
                                                          
29 J.B. Silvers, The Affordable Care Act: Objectives and Likely Results in an Imperfect World, 11 Ann Fam Med 402 
(2013). 
30 See Joshua M. Wiener, Strategies to Reduce Medicaid Spending: Findings from a Literature Review, The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation at 7 (June 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Strategies-to-Reduce-
Medicaid-Spending-Findings-from-a-Literature-Review. 
31 See American Hospital Association, Legal (Fraud and Abuse) Barriers To Care Transformation and How to Address 
Them at 8-10 (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.aha.org/system/files/content/16/barrierstocare-full.pdf.  
32 Nicholas Hodges, Accountable Care Organizations: Realigning the Incentive Problems in the U.S. Health Care 
System, 26 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 99, 100 (2015). 
33 Id. at 100-01. 
34 Hodges, supra note 32, at 104. 
35 Id.at 104; This is further complicated by “moral hazard”, which is when individuals do not fully realize the cost of 
their medical care and thus are inclined to over utilize, driving up costs and further burdening the health care 
system. The existence of health insurance moves health care out from the parameters of a “normal” market, and 
into a category of its own, which makes application of existing theories troublesome. 
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reimbursement rate available for a particular service.36  Further complicating this matter is the fact 
that providers face no penalties or rewards for their impact on patients’ future health.37 As a result, 
FFS stimulates the provision of services in general, even those that are marginally appropriate or 
even outright  inappropriate.38 
 Abuses of the FFS system can be seen in a variety of ways, none more obvious than when 
providers own or invest in other health care facilities.  For example, when providers maintain 
ownership or compensation arrangements with other referral locations or services, they are more 
likely to utilize those services.39  Even when their ownership is not based in their location, they 
refer patients 50% more than non-owners.40 In any other business no one would bat an eye, but in 
the arena of health care patients are being subjected to additional services that are likely 
unnecessary and potentially harmful because the system incentivizes the behavior.  The only things 
that exist to rein in FFS providers are patients who take an active role in monitoring the cost and 
provision of services, the professional ethics of the providers, the willingness of the patients to 
spend time for the procedures, and the willingness of the insurers to pay.41 Unfortunately, these 
constraints alone are not enough to defeat the provider incentives of FFS and therefore the health 
care system had to evaluate and implement other methods of cost control. 
  Managed care (MC) represents an alternative delivery and payment approach that holds 
the promise of inhibiting overutilization and other costly practices.42 MC organizes health care 
                                                          
36 Jost, supra note 16, at 251. 
37 Hodges, supra note 32, at 107. 
38 Blumstein, supra note 28, at 209. 
39 Id. (patients whose doctors had an ownership interest in laboratory services received 45% more lab services than 
patients whose doctors did not have such ownership interests); Id. (providers who owned diagnostic imaging 
equipment or services ordered tests 400% more than non-owners). 
40 Id. 
41 See id. (The major barrier providers face in driving up the bills of their patients is cost, eventually the patient will 
either run out of money or challenge the necessity of the services.  This barrier is all but eliminated once an 
individual has good insurance and never notices the charges because their “skin in the game” is minimal.).   
42 Id. at 205. 
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providers in an integrated and coordinated way to reduce costs.43 Under MC, providers are 
reimbursed a set amount for the care of each patient (capitation) and are subject to utilization 
review, which serves as a check on the quantity of services being ordered for patients.44 Utilization 
review is when an organization monitors and works with its participating providers to ensure that 
care is delivered in a cost-effective manner.45 The insurer acts as a gatekeeper, and vetoes any 
procedures that are deemed to be unnecessary from a cost perspective.46 Capitation seeks to control 
costs by shifting the risk of increased costs onto the providers themselves.47 Providers are paid a 
flat fee per patient for a given unit of time, if they are able to control costs and spend less than their 
fee, they keep the excess.48 If the patient consumes more resources than the fee allotted, the 
provider is responsible for the loss.49 Capitation therefore discourages volume-enhancing services 
that are typical in FFS fraud, as payment based on a flat rate removes incentives to increase number 
of services.50 Collectively, MC creates incentives to reduce costs by eliminating unnecessary care 
and performing less intensive procedures.51  
This new alignment of MC arrangement reduces the risks of fraud inherent in the FFS 
model, but invites new fraud and abuse issues.52  For instance, entities who employ MC engage in 
cherry-picking, where they intentionally seek to enroll healthier individuals so they do not have to 
expend as much of their capitated rate, thereby increasing their margin.53 As a result of this 
                                                          
43 Hodges, supra note 32, at 107. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Blumstein, supra note 28, at 206. 
51 Hodges, supra note 32, at 127. 
52 Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and 
Abuse?, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 373, 385 (Winter 1997). 
53 Id. at 389.  
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practice, the provision of quality care to those in need goes down.  One view is that providers who 
operate under a capitated basis will want to avoid, rather than gain, referrals thereby reducing the 
likelihood of overspending.54 However, due to the nature of the system, an entity under MC needs 
a certain number of covered lives in order to maintain viability, and therefore referrals into the 
system are a necessary part of staying in business.  Of course, the most important fact about the 
MC system is that FFS still exists, and there are few MC arrangements where all providers operate 
in a fixed cost basis.55 As the health care system continues to examine fraud and abuse practices, 
it becomes more apparent that regardless of the payment system employed, fraud and abuse 
practices remain in some form.56  
C. The Affordable Care Act’s Impact 
The rising costs of health care, combined with patients’ rejection of managed care57, 
prompted the government to devise an alternative delivery and reimbursement model that 
accomplished the goals of increased access to care and controlling Federal spending.  Enacted in 
2010, the ACA represented Congress’ response to these imperatives.58 Of particular focus is the 
inefficiency and high-cost of the FFS system and the extreme variations in access to quality care.59 
To this end, the ACA aims to shift reimbursement from one based on volume of services, to one 
based on the actual value of care.60 Tools employed by the ACA include accountable care 
                                                          
54 Id. at 409. 
55 Id.  at 390. 
56 See id. at 410 (every payment system has its weak spots, where those issues reside is dependent on the model 
employed). 
57 One possible reason for this is that consumers have rejected managed care arrangements in favor of fewer 
restrictions on their access to health care. 
58 See Melinda Abrams et al., Affordable Care Act’s Payment and Delivery System Reforms: A Progress Report at 
Five Years, The Commonwealth Fund at 1 (May 2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publi 
cations/issue-brief/2015/may/1816_abrams_aca_reforms_delivery_payment_rb.pdf. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2. 
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organizations (ACOs) and patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs).61 Operating under a 
complex reimbursement formula, a Medicare ACO assumes responsibility for the overall health 
of the population of patients to which it is assigned.62  The ACO comprises institutional and 
individual providers that collectively calibrate the quality and costs of its patient group with the 
goal of maintaining or improving overall health.63 The rationale for ACOs is that comprehensive, 
coordinated, and well-targeted care can reduce per-patient costs and improve patient outcomes.64  
This same philosophy is at the heart of PCMHs, which engage in comprehensive care coordination, 
patient engagement, and population health management.65  In both ACO and PCMH models, focus 
is on the provider’s ability to improve quality of care.66 
The ACA is also implementing quality-centric programs for all FFS providers.67  This year 
HHS has indicated it would like 90% of all traditional Medicare payments to be linked to either 
ACOs, PCMHs, bundled payments or other value-related approaches.68 These improvements in 
both access and quality are directed at many of the issues in FFS, specifically removing incentives 
to engage in unnecessary care.69 However, increasing coverage and improving quality of the 
system alone are not enough to produce the improvements in health outcomes the ACA seeks to 
create.  The health care system still needs to integrate and coordinate services across providers and 
settings, connecting to social supports and other services that address the broad range of social and 
environmental factors that impact health before the full potential of ACA cost-reduction can be 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.at 4. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (for example, bundled payments, which are a single reimbursement for all services given for a specific 
medical condition or procedure, incentivizing all providers to work cooperatively to enhance patient health). 
68 S. M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals—HHS Efforts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 New Eng. J. 
Med. 897 (2015). 
69 See Greaney, supra note 1, at 39. 
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realized.70  One method of reducing the disparities faced by underserved populations is by targeting 
SDH like transportation, which affords the opportunity to enter into gainful employment, access 
affordable foods, and engage in the health care system.71   
III. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Enforcement in the United States 
A. Why is Fraud and Abuse a Priority? 
Conservative estimates show that health care comprises 18% of the United States’ Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).72  This figure is expected to rise to 20% by 2020.73 With almost a trillion 
dollars at stake, it is not surprising that fraud and abuse are a rampant problem.  Fraud and abuse 
account for between $82 billion and $272 billion of the waste our health care system experiences 
every year.74 This figure represents upwards of 30% of the total waste in health care which includes 
other complex issues like failure of care delivery, lack of care coordination, over-treatment, 
administrative complexities, and pricing failures.75 As a result, the United States directs at least 
10% of its total health care spend towards eliminating, or at least mitigating, fraud, waste, and 
abuse.76  
The proliferation of health care fraud and abuse is due in part to the structure of the payment 
systems in place, which create incentives for certain kinds of provider behavior.77 From an ethical 
perspective, providers should focus on the legitimate provision of high-quality and cost-effective 
care, that is both conscientious and competent.78 However, FFS creates significant risks that 
                                                          
70 Heiman, supra note 3, at 8. 
71 See id. 
72 Irene Papanicolas, Liana R. Woskie & Ashish K. Jha, Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High-
Income Countries, 319 JAMA 1025, 1027 (2018). 
73 Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513 (2012). 
74 Id. at 1514. 
75 Id. at 1513-1514. 
76 Davies, supra note 52, at 378. 
77 Jost, supra note 16, at 250. 
78 See id. at 253. 
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providers will behave illegitimately, utilizing fraudulent recruiting practices or offering kickbacks 
to steer beneficiaries.79  When a particular act by a health care provider can have a benevolent or 
malevolent motivation or purpose, it can be incredibly challenging to determine into which 
category the act falls.80 Fraud and abuse laws are designed to help mitigate this issue, but there is 
no failsafe system for the financing and delivery of health care.81 As a result, fraud laws that were 
developed around the FFS model can negatively affect genuine providers whose “prohibited” 
actions are designed solely to benefit their patients.82 
Despite the fact that fraud enforcement can affect innocent parties, the executive 
administration has continued to highlight health care fraud as a top priority.83 Under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program (HCFAC) was established,84 and while the HCFAC has been successful,85 the 
ever-changing nature of health care fraud and abuse necessitates constant review and continuous 
strategy update.  In 2016, the Obama administration committed to reducing fraud, waste, and abuse 
across Medicare and Medicaid programs.86  Part of this announcement indicated an emphasis on 
detecting fraud through the use of sophisticated data analysis, predictive analytics, and modeling 
                                                          
79 Id.  
80 See id. at 254-55. 
81 See Davies, supra note 52, at 373. 
82 See id. at 250. 
83 Davies, supra note 52, at 376; Id. (noting that the Clinton administration placed enforcement of health care 
fraud as its second priority, only behind violent crimes in 1996); Id. (emphasis has been placed on a coordinated 
effort between the FBI, who investigates fraudulent practices, and the HHS OIG which focuses on ferreting out 
Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse claims). 
84 The Department of Health and Human Services And The Department of Justice Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2016 (Jan. 2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY 
2016-hcfac.pdf (HCFAC coordinates Federal and local enforcement activities concerning health care fraud and 
abuse). 
85 Id. (since inception the HCFAC has returned approximately $30 billion to Medicare, a $6.10 per dollar return on 
investment). 
86 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Protects 
Consumers and Taxpayers by Combating Health Care Fraud (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-
sheet-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-control-program-protects-conusmers-and-taxpayers. 
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to find both existing fraud patterns and to identify suspect fraud trends.87 Combined with the shift 
in the health care payment system to value-based care, incentives to engage in fraudulent practices 
are being reduced.  Notwithstanding these changes, the AKS still remains a primary enforcement 
tool to curb health care fraud and abuse. 
B. The Anti-Kickback Statute 
The AKS, written in the context of the FFS system88, provides criminal penalties for 
individuals or entities that knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive remuneration in 
order to induce or reward the referral of business reimbursable under Federal Health Care 
Programs.89 Remuneration includes any kickback, bribe, or rebate that can be offered directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.90 The AKS centers on health care providers who 
are motivated by their own financial interest, and as such will over-utilize medical services through 
the referral of patients for unnecessary medical treatments.91 Congress established strong penalties 
for an AKS violation, including fines up to $25,000, imprisonment for up to 5 years, and the 
possibility of limiting, restricting, or suspending for up to one year the violator’s eligibility to 
participate in Federal Health Care Programs.92 Importantly, actual knowledge of this statute, or the 
specific intent to violate this statute, is not required to be found guilty of a violation.93  
                                                          
87 Id.; Michael Parker & Dennis Bentley, The Affordable Care Act Has Improved the Way the Federal Government 
Fights Health Care Fraud, But the Rate of Return on the Investment is Still Being Measured, The Fed. Law. at 33 
(Dec. 2016) (the use of proactive information-technology platforms and comprehensive data-mining which has led 
to an increase in recovery for Federal Health Care Programs of approximately $1 billion each year).  
88 Stephanie Zaremba, A healthcare law held together by duct tape, aetnainsight (Aug. 12, 2016) 
https://www.athenahealth.com/insight/health-care-fraud-and-abuse-laws. 
89 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368 (Dec. 7, 2016) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1003), see also 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b 
(2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (in addition to AKS criminal action, OIG may seek civil monetary penalties of up to 
$50,000 for each improper act and damages of up to three times the amount of remuneration at issue, regardless 
of whether some of the remuneration was for a lawful purpose). 
90 Id. 
91 Michael E. Paulhus, Note, The Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute: In Need of Reconstructive Surgery for the Digital 
Age, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 677, 691 (2002). 
92 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (2018). 
93 Id. 
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The regulatory structure of AKS has been criticized for being overly broad, sweeping in 
“technical” fraud, behavior that would not constitute fraud under the ordinary legal term.94 Due to 
this concern, many believe the AKS limits development of the health care system by threatening 
innovative business arrangements that focus on novel, value-maximizing approaches.95 The notion 
that the AKS is so blunt in its structure, that it could prohibit arrangements that are actually more 
efficient and cost-effective than existing programs, is supported by the use of the “one-purpose 
test.”96  In United States v. Greber, the Third Circuit held that if one purpose of a payment was to 
induce future reciprocal referrals, the payment violated the AKS.97  The court assumed the services 
were needed, medically appropriate, and reasonably priced, but nevertheless constituted an AKS 
violation.98 Under Greber the use of financial incentives or remuneration for the purpose of 
inducing patient flow, even if small, is problematic.99 Having now been codified in the AKS, 
Greber precludes a defense that the targeted innovation advances efficient and economical care.100  
A further criticism of the AKS is that it is inefficient and not designed to adapt easily with 
changes in the health care system.101  Providers are technically stuck between adhering to the FFS-
based AKS and trying to align practices with the new wave of alternative health payment 
models.102  Rather than amending or updating the AKS to reflect these changes, the primary tool 
OIG has employed in recognizing the alternative payment models has been safe harbors.  While 
                                                          
94 See Christopher J. Climo, Note, A Laboratory of Regulation: The Untapped Potential of the HHS Advisory Opinion 
Power, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1761, 1769 (2015).  See also Paulhus, supra note 91, at 693 (noting that because Congress 
intended courts to interpret “remuneration” broadly, both unscrupulous providers and innocuous and socially 
beneficial arrangements would be treated similarly). 
95 See id. 
96 See Jost, supra note 16, at 210. 
97 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985). 
98 Id. at 71. 
99 Blumstein, supra note 28, at 213. 
100 Id. at 214. 
101 James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond The Anti-Kickback Statute: New Entities, New Theories In 
Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. Health L. 167 (Spring 2007). 
102 See generally American Hospital Association, supra note 31.  
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safe harbors do represent an opportunity to drive positive change in the health care system, they 
are often reactive rather than proactive, hindering innovation.103   
C. The Narrow Safe Harbors of the Anti-Kickback Statute 
In 1987, Congress enacted §14 of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program 
Protection Act, which allowed HHS to promulgate safe harbors that, if satisfied in their entirety, 
insulate actors from AKS liability.104 Safe harbor regulations describe payment and business 
practices that, although they potentially implicate the AKS, the government will not treat as 
offenses under the statute because of a determination that the positive goals of the activity105, and 
embedded protections, mitigate the risks of fraud.106 Currently, there are 28 safe harbor 
provisions.107 While the OIG has authority to create these regulatory exceptions, Congress gave 
little guidance as to what they should entail.108 As a result, OIG exercises its authority cautiously 
and limits the exceptions only to those areas in which Congress has indicated a desire for 
flexibility, or where such provision of remunerations serve a government interest.109 
OIG’s goal with any safe harbor is to protect those beneficial arrangements that enhance 
the efficient and effective delivery of health care, and protect the best interest of the patients.110 In 
order to be successful, safe harbors must be updated periodically to reflect the ever-changing 
                                                          
103 See Zaremba, supra note 88. 
104 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368, 88,369. 
105 Climo, supra note 94, at 1764 (safe harbors are seen as prosocial, meaning they do not exert pressure on the 
costs or quality of Federal Health Care Programs, and providers are able to invest in value-maximizing approaches). 
106 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Safe Harbor Regulation (last visited March 24, 
2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/safe-harbor-regulations/index.asp; Adrienne Dresevic, Clinton Mikel & 
Robert Dindoffer, In This Issue, Significant Changes to Anti-Kickback Statute Safe Harbor/Exceptions to the Civil 
Monetary Penalty Law, 29 Health Law. 23 (Aug. 2017) (if a particular arrangement meets the safe harbor it is found 
to comply with the AKS and is not subject to prosecution). 
107 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2018). 
108 See 67 Fed. Reg. 72,892 (December 9, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). 
109 See id. at 72,983. 
110 79 Fed. Reg.  59,717, 59,719 (Oct. 3, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1003). 
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business and technology changes in the health care industry.111 Using guidelines in §1128D(a)(2) 
of HIPAA, the Secretary of HHS may consider a variety of factors when examining a payment 
practice.112 Given the breadth of the factors, one would assume that OIG would be promulgating 
multiple safe harbors to advance practices that are beneficial to Federal Health Care Programs as 
payment models move beyond FFS. However, since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in 2010 only three safe harbors have been finalized.113 Rather than encouraging health system 
development through flexible and appropriate safe harbors, OIG has stymied providers’ ability to 
innovate and implement programs that can create cost-savings and increase quality of health care. 
The obstruction in innovation is further restricted by how narrow OIG constructs safe 
harbors.  A party’s conduct must fall completely within the contours of the safe harbor to be 
immune from prosecution.114 If a single provision is missed, or incorrectly applied, the party is 
subject to prosecutorial discretion, which emphasizes the requisite intent to violate the AKS.115 
Because the intent standard for AKS is so low, providers undertake large risks in implementing 
programs whose nonconformance is minute.116 When implementing potentially valuable programs 
that do not appear to completely conform to existing safe harbors, providers are left with two 
options: hope that prosecutors do not notice or care, or seek an advisory opinion. This means that 
                                                          
111 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368. 
112 Id. (These include an increase or decrease in: access to health care services; the quality of health care services; 
patient freedom of choice among providers; the ability of health care providers to offer services to medically 
underserved areas or populations; the cost to Federal Health Care Programs; the potential overutilization of health 
care services; the existence or nonexistence of any financial benefit to a health care provider; and any other 
factors the Secretary deems appropriate in preventing fraud and abuse in Federal Health Care Programs.). 
113 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Safe Harbor Regulation (last visited March 24, 
2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/safe-harbor-regulations/index.asp. 
114 Jeffrey B. Hammond, What Exactly is Healthcare Fraud After the Affordable Care Act?, 42 Stetson L. Rev. 35, 66 
(2012). 
115 See id.; The party then has to show that their conduct is not violative, but instead seeks to satisfy goals that the 
government approves, while still maintaining sufficient protections against using remuneration to induce referrals.  
116 See id.; see also Dresevic, supra note 105, at 23 (A party can avoid AKS liability if they do not have the requisite 
intent to induce referrals or if other elements of the AKS are not met.  However, unfamiliarity with the AKS is not a 
defense and if one-purpose of the activity is to induce referrals then the party is liable.). 
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there are likely a number of appropriate, innovative, and socially beneficially programs in the 
marketplace that safe harbors have failed to protect, and which providers are unwilling to 
implement for fear of prosecution.117  
Many providers are uncomfortable relying on prosecutorial discretion so they seek an 
advisory opinion, which can clarify the meaning and applicability of the AKS to a particular 
arrangement.118 While advisory opinions are only binding on the requesting party,119 other 
providers use them as guideposts for assessing likelihood of AKS enforcement. Unfortunately, 
much like safe harbors, advisory opinions are issued infrequently, averaging fewer than 20 per 
year.120 Further confounding the issue is that advisory opinions are cost-prohibitive, and many 
smaller practices and low-resource providers are unable to access these individualized opinions in 
order to evaluate their arrangements under AKS liability.121  Greater OIG flexibility is needed to 
give providers the freedom to create innovative programming that can reduce the burden on 
Federal Health Care Programs and increase health care system efficiencies.  One solution to 
responding to the changes in the health care marketplace is the modification or expansion of safe 
harbors to create stronger alignment with the current payment trends. 
IV.  The Free Transportation Safe Harbor 
A. History and Development 
The SDH impact our lives in many complex ways, and none has more touchpoints than 
transportation.122 Transportation is necessary to access goods and services like health care, food, 
                                                          
117 Blumstein, supra note 28, at 225. 
118 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7d(b)(4) (2018). 
119 Id. 
120 See Climo, supra note 94, at 1782. 
121 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, MEDICARE: Advisory Opinions as a Means of Clarifying Program 
Requirements (2004), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/244922.pdf (describing the expenses that providers must 
bear to secure an advisory opinion), see also Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Advisory Opinions FAQ (2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/faqs/advisory-opinions-faq.asp.  
122 Id. at 6. 
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education, employment, and social engagement.123 Transportation barriers to health care are 
incredibly significant, as people who do not have adequate transportation experience poor health 
outcomes, increased health care utilization, and increased health care costs.124  The issue is not 
minor, every year almost four million people fail to obtain any medical care due to transportation 
barriers.125 Of those who are able to obtain health care, many are unable to make necessary 
appointments.126  These effects are felt most strongly by vulnerable groups like children, older 
adults, less educated, minorities, and low income families.127  If transportation barriers are not 
addressed, there will continue to be missed appointments, failed prescription fills, and other issues 
which lead to delayed care, disease progression and increased hospital visits.128 It is estimated that 
missed appointments and delays in care cost the U.S. health care system $150 billion each year.129  
Providers are positioned to positively impact the health of the populations they serve by addressing 
transportation issues.130 Without appropriate safeguards in place however, the provision of 
transportation can bring AKS liability. 
The OIG is aware that transportation impacts health care costs, and has been discussing a 
safe harbor for local transportation, colloquially known as the “Free Transportation” safe harbor, 
since 2002.131 In its first appearance for solicitation of comments, OIG noted that while Congress 
had intended not to preclude the provision of free local transportation of a nominal value, the 
limitation was potentially overly restrictive.132  OIG was therefore interested in learning  what 
                                                          
123 Id. 
124 Id.at 4. 
125 Id. at 6. 
126 Id. (every year three million children miss a health care appointment due to lack of transportation, and older 
adults cite lack of transportation as the third most common barrier to accessing health services). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 9. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb) (2018); 67 Fed. Reg. 72,892. 
132 Id. at 72,893. (at the time $10 per transaction and $50 annually). 
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forms of transportation should be protected, what geographic area limitations should be placed on 
the transportation, and what other potential eligibility criteria, if any, commentators would deem 
appropriate to increase availability of transportation without increasing the potential for fraudulent 
activities.133  
After the solicitation of comments, a series of advisory opinions discussing provision of 
transportation services was released. As they are only applicable to the individual Requestor, under 
the facts of the proposed arrangement, advisory opinions only indicate what type of arrangements 
OIG thinks do not raise significant fraud and abuse concerns.  From the opinions on transportation 
services, it is apparent that OIG is focused on several issues: eligibility criteria for the service, type 
of transportation, geographic area, advertisement and marketing practices, availability of 
transportation options, cost-shifting to Federal Health Care Programs, and whether or not the 
arrangement is designed to induce referrals.  These overarching concepts were present in the first 
advisory opinion on the topic134, which was for a skilled nursing facility offering free 
transportation for its residents’ friends and family, likely to increase perceived value.135 OIG noted 
that free transportation has important and beneficial effects on patient care, especially where it is 
narrowly tailored to address financial need, limited resources, and treatment compliance or safety, 
even going as far to allow local newspaper ads promoting the service.136 At the same time, OIG 
                                                          
133 Id. 
134 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-01, 5-6 (March 6, 
2009) (the analytical factors used in deciding whether the arrangement was an AKS violation: if transportation was 
offered in a manner related to referrals, specifically the relation to the volume or value of Federal Health Care 
Program business; the use of luxury or specialized transportation is suspect; the geographic area, transportation 
outside of a primary service area is suspect and leap-frog arrangements (bypassing other providers) is problematic; 
availability of alternative transportation, including public transit or affordable alternatives; marketing or 
advertising brings greater risk of referral inducement; transport outside of the offeror’s network is suspect; cost of 
the transportation should be borne by the offeror; and where the offeror is also a provider, there is concern the 
purpose is to gain access to beneficiaries for unnecessary or inappropriate services). 
135 Id.at 4-5. 
136 Id. 
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explained that transportation services can be used in fraud and abuse schemes to steer patients, 
leading to overutilization and provision of medically unnecessary services.137 This balance 
between risk of fraud due to the problematic incentives of FFS, and the offering of transportation 
arrangements that are beneficial to the community, is the central tension of the safe harbor.  
After the comment period, OIG began to refine its analyses through several additional 
opinions and a notice of proposed rulemaking.  Three advisory opinions in 2011 helped further 
delineate the rationale OIG was employing in deciding whether free transportation arrangements 
promoted access to care without increasing the risk of fraud, but analysis still existed under a FFS 
framework and not the ACA’s proposed shift toward value-based payments.  In the first advisory 
opinion of 2011 the Requestor, a charitable pediatric hospital, sought to implement transportation 
assistance for its patients.138 Under the arrangement, the Requestor would pay for local and long-
distance transportation for families in need, based on the exigent circumstances of the case and the 
availability of funds.139 OIG concluded that it would not seek administrative action against the 
transportation assistance program because it promoted access to care with a focus on the medical 
and financial need of the patients, and did not engage in any other suspect practices outlined above 
(e.g. no advertising or cost-shifting to Federal Health Care Programs).140 
Two months later, OIG analyzed a Requestor’s proposed arrangement to use an EMT to 
transport patients across its campus, from provider offices to the Requestor’s hospital when further 
evaluation or treatment was required and patients were unable to transport themselves.141  While 
                                                          
137 Id. 
138 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 11-01 at 2-3 (Jan. 3, 
2011). 
139 Id. at 7. 
140 Id. at 13. 
141 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 11-02 (March 17, 
2011). 
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the proposed arrangement did implicate the AKS, again OIG refused to enforce administrative 
sanctions, noting the arrangement did not engage in any suspect practices.142 The final 
transportation advisory opinion of 2011 targeted transportation to the Requestor’s facility, which 
treated catastrophic disease in children.143 Because more than 70% of the Requestor’s patients 
lived over 35 miles away, the proposed arrangement offered assistance to the patient and one parent 
or guardian who expressed a need for assistance in order to make accessing services easier.144 
There were three levels of assistance available depending on distance from the Requestor’s facility, 
with greater assistance available as distance between the patient and Requestor increased.145 The 
OIG declined to take administrative action due to lack of the same suspect practices from earlier 
opinions.146 Of importance in this request was that the unique nature of the service made it unlikely 
that patients would engage in unnecessary services or that the patient would bypass other facilities 
to receive treatment.147  OIG felt that due to the substantial public benefits of the Requestor and 
the type of care that was offered the risk of fraud was minimal.148 
Just prior to the issuance of Advisory Opinion No. 11-16, OIG issued a proposed rule to 
revise the safe harbors under the AKS.149  Similar to the discussion under the solicitation of public 
comments nine years earlier, OIG was concerned that the nominal value limitations were overly 
restrictive on transportation services.150 The proposed rule noted that certain types of entities may 
                                                          
142 Id. at 5. 
143 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 11-16 at 1-2 (Nov. 8, 
2011). 
144 Id. at 2.  
145 Id.at 4 (patients within 35 miles had access to a shuttle service if they had no other means of transport; patients 
who were between 35-300 miles had access to bus or rail travel, or could be reimbursed for mileage; and patients 
over 300 miles had the addition of air travel reimbursement). 
146 Id.at 7. 
147 Id. at 7-8 
148 Id. 
149 79 Fed. Reg. 59,717. 
150 Id.at 59,722. 
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have legitimate financial and patient care interests in providing transportation, and that they, 
depending on the particular circumstances, could benefit Federal Health Care Programs by 
reducing costs and improving beneficiaries care and access.151  Responding to the ACA, OIG was 
interested in creating an exception for those arrangements which promoted access to care and 
posed a low risk of harm to patients and Federal Health Care Programs.152 OIG defined promoting 
access to care as improving a particular beneficiary’s ability to obtain medical necessary services, 
and wanted to know if the definition should be expanded to include non-clinical services that 
reasonably related to the patient’s medical care, specifically social services.153  
Prior to the final rule, OIG issued one more advisory opinion concerning the provision of 
free transportation services via shuttle service.154 Under the proposed arrangement, a shuttle would 
transport patients of the Requestor’s system between multiple facilities and the town where their 
main facility was located.155 OIG concluded that the proposed arrangements presented a minimal 
risk of fraud and abuse under the AKS for similar reason that had been articulated in all previous 
advisory opinions.156 Interestingly, in each of the advisory opinions relating to free transportation 
OIG discussed the same factors that were mostly delineated in Advisory Opinion 09-01, which 
was written before the passing of the ACA.  After the passage of ACA, OIG acknowledged that 
access to care was an additional consideration that pertained to the specific facts and circumstances 
of each arrangement, but analyses did not change, nor did it appear that the OIG understood the 
need to work outside of the FFS model.    
 
                                                          
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 59,725. 
153 Id.  
154 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 15-13 (Oct. 24, 2015). 
155 Id. at 3. 
156 Id. at 6. 
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B. The Final Rule 
On December 7, 2016, OIG issued the final rule for the free transportation safe harbor,157 
which has since been codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb).158 According to OIG, the purpose of 
this safe harbor is to protect Federal Health Care Programs and patients from fraud and abuse while 
                                                          
157 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368. 
158 (bb) Local Transportation. As used in section 1128B of the Act, “remuneration” does not include free or 
discounted local transportation made available by an eligible entity (as defined in this paragraph (bb)): 
(1) To Federal health care program beneficiaries if all the following conditions are met: 
(i) The availability of the free or discounted local transportation services— 
(A) Is set forth in a policy, which the eligible entity applies uniformly and consistently; and 
(B) Is not determined in a manner related to the past or anticipated volume or value of Federal 
health care program business; 
(ii) The free or discounted local transportation services are not air, luxury, or ambulance-level 
transportation; 
(iii) The eligible entity does not publicly market or advertise the free or discounted local transportation 
services, no marketing of health care items and services occurs during the course of the transportation 
or at any time by drivers who provide the transportation, and drivers or others arranging for the 
transportation are not paid on a per-beneficiary-transported basis; 
(iv) The eligible entity makes the free or discounted transportation available only: 
(A) To an individual who is: 
(1) An established patient (as defined in this paragraph (bb)) of the eligible entity that is 
providing the free or discounted transportation, if the eligible entity is a provider or 
supplier of health care services; and 
(2) An established patient of the provider or supplier to or from which the individual is 
being transported; 
(B) Within 25 miles of the health care provider or supplier to or from which the patient would be 
transported, or within 50 miles if the patient resides in a rural area, as defined in this paragraph 
(bb); and 
(C) For the purpose of obtaining medically necessary items and services. 
(v) The eligible entity that makes the transportation available bears the costs of the free or discounted 
local transportation services and does not shift the burden of these costs onto any Federal health care 
program, other payers, or individuals; and 
(2) In the form of a “shuttle service” (as defined in this paragraph (bb)) if all of the following conditions are met: 
(i) The shuttle service is not air, luxury, or ambulance-level transportation; 
(ii) The shuttle service is not marketed or advertised (other than posting necessary route and schedule 
details), no marketing of health care items and services occurs during the course of the transportation 
or at any time by drivers who provide the transportation, and drivers or others arranging for the 
transportation are not paid on a per-beneficiary-transported basis; 
(iii) The eligible entity makes the shuttle service available only within the eligible entity's local area, 
meaning there are no more than 25 miles from any stop on the route to any stop at a location where 
health care items or services are provided, except that if a stop on the route is in a rural area, the 
distance may be up to 50 miles between that that stop and all providers or suppliers on the route; and 
(iv) The eligible entity that makes the shuttle service available bears the costs of the free or discounted 
shuttle services and does not shift the burden of these costs onto any Federal health care program, 
other payers, or individuals. 
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still allowing providers the enhanced flexibility to engage in innovative health care business 
arrangements. 159 Specifically, the safe harbor advances patients’ choice of high quality providers, 
the appropriate utilization of health care services, and positive health care competition.160 The new 
rule also protects against increased health care costs, inappropriate patient steering, and the general 
harms associated with prohibited remuneration.161 OIG considered how health care delivery 
system and payment reform affected Federal Health Care Programs, but did not address emerging 
payment arrangements.162 Interestingly, Congress intended for safe harbors to evolve along with 
changes in the health care system , which include alternative payment models,163 but the failure to 
develop the rule under these changes is troubling. Despite this issue, OIG believes that the rule 
meets the goals of the AKS and ACA by balancing flexibility for industry stakeholders in 
providing efficient, well-coordinated, and patient-centered care with protections against known 
and anticipated fraud and abuse risks.164  
Part of the final rule process entails a discussion of the commentary received and OIG’s 
decision on whether to incorporate that commentary or to substitute its own instead.165 A brief 
review of these comments is necessary to show the safe harbor’s relation to provider challenges, 
the SDH, and the ACA.  One particularly important comment focuses on the decision by OIG to 
decline to extend coverage of transportation services to anything that is not medically necessary.166 
According to OIG, non-medically necessary services pose an increased risk of inducing patients 
                                                          
159 81 Fed. Reg. 88,368. 
160 Id. at 88,369. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.at 88,371 (despite the growing popularity and necessity of transportation arrangements in health care, there 
were only 88 individual commentators who participated in the process). 
166 Id.at 88,384; Medicare defines “medically necessary” as “health care services…needed to diagnose or treat an 
illness, injury, condition, disease, or its symptoms and that meet accepted standards of medicine.” Medically 
necessary, Glossary, https://www.medicare.gov/glossary/m.html. 
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to over utilize services.167   For example, determining whether a particular destination is actually 
related to health is difficult.168 Transportation for issues like food security, via access to a grocery 
store in a shopping mall, may actually be used for alternative or additional purposes.169    
Furthermore, transportation for non-medical services has the potential to be more frequent170 and 
this gives larger providers significant advantage over smaller entities.171 These comments 
seemingly ignore the substantial benefit that non-medically necessary services can have on 
patients’ overall health.172 Aggravating this fact is OIG’s admission that providers still can create 
access to non-medically necessary services via shuttle service,173 despite the fact that shuttle 
services are much more limited under the safe harbor.  
In addition to the above, the final rule declined to mandate specific eligibility terms or 
situations where transportation would be protected, leaving it up to providers to interpret the statute 
or request advisory opinions.174  As noted earlier, this limitation has the potential to stifle 
innovation because providers either cannot afford advisory opinions, or are hesitant to engage in 
activities that may render them liable under the AKS.  While the rule does place providers with 
greater financial resources in a stronger position to implement transportation programs, OIG 
believes that the specified criteria of the safe harbor mitigates that risk.175  For example, because 
no provider can advertise or market these programs, having more resources does not necessarily 
equate to increased participation.176 In a similar vein, OIG stated that the safe harbor will not 
                                                          
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 People access the grocery store more often than medical care. 
171 Id. 
172 For example, a patient who has significant food security issues may receive substantially more benefit from 
access to healthy, affordable food as compared to the ability to get a physical. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 88,384. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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negatively affect competition among providers, because overall patients will now be able to select 
from a larger pool of providers,177 but this assumes that providers have the resources and will chose 
to offer the service. 
A series of comments centered on the definition of an established patient and allowable 
recruitment practices.178 In order to qualify as an “established,” a patient is not required to have 
already been seen by the provider; instead they only need to have scheduled an appointment.179 
This initial contact establishes the relationship, which then allows the provider to engage the 
patient in a discussion of transportation needs.180 If a provider does offer transportation services, 
they cannot place limits on which service or provider the patient chooses.181  This serves a dual-
purpose of promoting increased access via competition and reduces ability of providers to self-
refer. In addition, providers cannot take an individual’s status as a Federal Health Care Program 
beneficiary into account, only the need for transportation services.182  While this will likely result 
in a disproportionate number of individuals who are elderly and low-income,183 the decision is not 
based on insurance type which is a concern of the AKS.184  
Three other comments are worth noting.  First, OIG encourages but does not require the 
provider to document its free transportation activities, as OIG recognizes it can be a burdensome 
practice.185 This means that providers are not required to keep any records of the transportation 
services they offer, which is a focus of fraud enforcement and is unlike the detailed records 
                                                          
177 Id. at 88,380-81. 
178 Id. at 88,383. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 88,383, 88,387. 
181 Id. at 88,381-82 (providers offering transportation cannot only offer transportation within their network, 
patients must be able to access any provider of the service the patient seeks to obtain). 
182 Id. at 88,384. 
183 These two groups are more likely to be Federal Health Care Program beneficiaries. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 88,383. 
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required for the provision of health care services.  Second, specific mileage limits were selected 
because they were a simple, bright line test that is easier for providers to apply.186 Rather than 
creating a formula that could be applied, providers must determine whether they are in an urban 
or rural location as defined by the Metropolitan Statistical Area or New England County 
Metropolitan Area.187 Finally, OIG did not think the shuttle service poses an increased risk of fraud 
or abuse because it is subject to other limitations, like a marketing restriction, that will reduce the 
ability of the provider to recruit patients using the offer of free transportation.188 While it may 
appear at first glance that OIG tried to balance the mandates of both the AKS and ACA, the safe 
harbor is still too restrictive.  As the payment incentive system continues to shift, providers will 
be limited in their ability to provide necessary services, like transportation, for at-risk populations.   
V. How We Can Get the Boat and Harbor Back in Alignment 
In order to effectively showcase the shortcomings of the final Free Transportation safe 
harbor, it is helpful to break out both the individual and shuttle transportation provisions into 
their separate conditions.  From there, each provision will be analyzed under both the AKS and 
ACA frameworks to delineate which conditions are appropriate and which conditions need to be 
removed, modified, or expanded in order for the safe harbor to more closely align with the 
current goals of the ACA, with emphasis shift to value-based payments. Specific attention will 
be devoted to describing that while risk of fraud may appear to increase, the potential savings to 
Federal Health Care Programs, through impact on the SDH, should outweigh any AKS concerns.   
There are multitude ways to break down the safe harbor, but for purposes of this analysis 
the individual transportation provision is separated into ten components: (1) the services are set 
                                                          
186 Id. at 88,388. 
187 Id. at 88,387 (any area that is not defined as urban under these systems is classified as rural). 
188 Id. at 88,389-90. 
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forth in a policy that is uniformly and consistently applied; (2) eligibility is not based on past or 
anticipated volume or value of Federal Health Care Program business; (3) documentation for 
each individualized transportation service is not required; (4) transportation cannot be provided 
via air, luxury, or ambulance; (5) providers cannot market or advertise both the transportation 
services nor services the provider offers; (6) drivers of the transportation service cannot be paid 
on a per-beneficiary transported basis; (7) only established patients are eligible for the services; 
(8) transportation is limited to a radius of 25 miles in urban settings, 50 miles in rural settings; 
(9) the provider cannot shift the costs onto Federal Health Care Programs, payors, or individuals; 
and (10) transportation is only available for medically necessary services.189 
 Of these ten conditions, five are appropriate to achieve the goals of both the ACA and 
AKS frameworks.  The first is the condition that providers must establish a policy that is applied 
uniformly and consistently.  Under this condition, providers can have a needs-based policy, but 
they must apply that to all participants.   If individualized decisions could be made, there is a 
high likelihood that providers would only utilize the service to attract patients who were of the 
greatest “value”. Not only would this increase the chances of fraudulent practices, but it would 
jeopardize the provision of quality care to those in need.  The second condition is not basing 
eligibility on past or anticipated volume or value of Federal Health Care Program business.  This 
condition is a relatively straightforward application of the AKS.  Providers cannot place burdens 
on Federal Health Care Programs by encouraging overutilization of services as compared to 
other types of payment.  From the perspective of the ACA, while Medicare and Medicaid 
patients tend to be vulnerable, restrictions solely to these populations would not promote overall 
access to care. The third condition is the limitation on the type of transportation. Specialized 
                                                          
189 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb) (2018). 
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transportation can only serve the purpose of inducing referrals, and whether the ride is in a limo 
or a van makes no difference in increasing access to services.  Directly related to this condition, 
is the requirement that drivers cannot be paid on a per-beneficiary basis. Without this condition, 
drivers would be incentivized to bring as many patients as possible to the provider, likely 
increasing unnecessary services and increasing costs on the Federal government.  The final 
condition is that the provider cannot shift costs of the transportation service onto any payor. 
Under the AKS reducing spending for Federal Health Care Programs is of particular focus, and 
this condition prevents increases costs.  Under the ACA, some assumption of risk by the provider 
is good, as providers will only deliver appropriate care, reducing the government spend.  The 
five conditions left represent the potential to inhibit the goals of the ACA, and in some cases are 
in direct tension with the AKS. Utilizing the Jane Smith case study, each of these conditions will 
be expounded upon to show its shortcomings and potential solutions to improve the safe harbor. 
 At first review, the marketing and advertising condition fits right into the AKS 
framework.  Allowing providers to showcase a valuable service across their catchment area does 
present the potential to induce referrals.  However, much like Jane Smith, many individuals who 
are in the most need of health care services may never take the initial step in contacting a 
provider, and therefore never utilize the transportation service. More importantly is that it 
appears OIG only considered FFS reimbursement. However, as the market shifts towards value-
based payment, providers are rewarded for keeping the population healthy, not for rendering 
more services.  Patients like Jane would actually benefit the provider if she was kept healthy 
through preventative care, rather than accessing expensive emergency procedures.  Furthermore, 
Jane’s admission into the NICU would consume more Federal Health Care Program resources 
than consistent pre-natal visits.  This is exactly what the ACA emphasizes:  utilizing preventative 
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to drive positive health outcomes.  By removing the ability of providers to notify the community, 
especially those who may not reach out on their own, the risks of delayed care and missed 
appointments are increased, which can enlarge costs to Federal Health Care Programs. Because 
providers’ reimbursement is driven by value and not volume, the risk of advertising being used 
inappropriately is minimal as compared to 10 years ago.  Modifying the condition to allow for 
marketing and advertising services within limits, as was done in Advisory Opinion 09-01 which 
permitted advertising on a limited local basis, holds promise.  Containing the promotion within a 
defined area limits risk of leapfrogging and reduces the pool of patients that could be referred 
inappropriately.  Furthermore, under the new payment models, as long as appropriate medical 
care is being rendered, risk of fraud is minimal.   
 The established patient condition shares some of the same flaws and potential solutions 
as advertising.  If patients are not engaged in their own health care, then they will likely never 
become “established”.  Without being established, the same problem that Jane experienced above 
will repeat itself.  Failure to receive appropriate care at appropriate times leads to an increased 
risk that emergency services, or other high-cost services, will be utilized, which in turn creates 
higher costs to Federal Health Care Programs. The OIG likely included this condition out of fear 
that providers would cold-call patients and use free transportation to induce referrals. While that 
type of behavior should not be allowable, even if it increased access to care, there is room to 
modify the condition and still protect against fraud. Following a similar rationale from the 
advertising and marketing expansion, allowing providers limited ability to reach out to social 
service providers to target those in need of transportation services to access care could be 
beneficial and have a limited risk of fraud. Agencies that provide social services are mission-
driven and seek to provide for their clients first, not serve the health care providers. As a result, 
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the agencies will not over-refer patients to receive a kickback.  By shifting the power of referrals 
outside of the provider’s hands, risk of fraud is automatically reduced.  At the same time access 
to care increases, as resource gaps in social service agencies are filled by providers. 
 One of the more perplexing conditions is that providers are not required to maintain any 
individualized documentation of the services they provide, henceforth known as data collection.  
As noted by the Department of Justice, data analytics has become one of the most powerful tools 
to disrupt and prevent fraudulent abuses of the health care system. Despite this, OIG failed to 
require that providers maintain data on their transportation services, only stating that it is a best 
practice.  The failure to make data collection mandatory, at least in some capacity, seems 
contradictory to cost-effective fraud prevention. If a provider is rendering transportation services 
that are suspect, OIG is not guaranteed an efficient method of reviewing the process other than 
through “boots on the ground” investigative work which likely require more time and money 
than data analysis. Besides actual enforcement procedures, data collection increases 
transparency, reducing the likelihood that providers will engage in inappropriate behavior. Of 
course this will be burdensome to providers, and may increase the number of providers who 
forgo offering services due to the cost-prohibitive nature, but if the concern is prohibiting 
fraudulent activity then record-keeping is essential.  Another important concept is that data is 
necessary for improvement and growth.  Records can be used for strategic planning to drive 
population health improvements, which under value-based system results in increased savings. 
For example, if the provider in Jane’s city collected data regarding participants in their 
transportation program, they may be able to identify key areas for expansion, increasing access 
points and revenue.  To limit complexity, the safe harbor could mandate the collection of specific 
data points that are beneficial, which would create uniformity and consistency for easier fraud 
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analysis. The ability to differentiate between legitimate and improper use of free transportation 
services would prevent fraudulent practices or at least explicitly show that risk of fraud is so 
minimal that recordkeeping is unnecessary.   If the latter is the case, then an overly restrictive 
safe harbor would seem inappropriate.   
 Since its early discussions of free transportation services, OIG has indicated concern with 
leap-frogging.190  As a result, OIG placed a condition on the distance that providers can go in 
offering free transportation.  Unfortunately, while the rural area limitation of 50 miles may seem 
appropriate, a 25-mile radius for urban areas allows for leap-frogging relatively easily.  Take for 
instance in New Jersey, where the top-rated hospital has over 20 hospitals within a 25-mile 
radius, many of which are significantly under-funded. Under the current safe harbor, the “best” 
hospitals have the ability to expend considerable resources to poach patients from providers.  
While there may be an increase in access to quality care, it comes at the expense of every other 
institution.191 Support for modifying this condition is found in the fact that most people travel 
less than 10 miles to access a hospital.192 If the AKS is concerned about providers using 
transportation as an inducement to take patients from other entities, this condition seems to be 
problematic. What makes the situation worse is that the opposite effect could happen, and lower-
quality hospitals might use the extended reach to take patients away from better performing 
providers.  For example, perhaps Jane is actually closer to a higher-quality hospital, but due to 
their reputation they do not need to drive volume by providing transportation services.  Instead, a 
                                                          
190 When providers recruit patients from another provider’s service-area, bypassing one entity in favor of another. 
191 Granted there are important exceptions to his blanket statement, for example a hospital with a neo-natal 
intensive care unit and 24-hour neonatologist may be the best facility for a high-risk pregnancy, and therefore 
leap-frogging would be appropriate.  However, these represent outliers that would likely utilize ambulance 
services, as compared to non-emergent situations where there presents greater incentive to induce referrals. 
192 See Amy M. Brown, Sandra L. Decker & Frederic W. Selck, Emergency Department Visits and Proximity to 
Patients’ Residences, 2009-2010, NCHS Data Brief (March 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 
25932892. 
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low-performing institution that has some expendable income uses the safe harbor to pull Jane out 
from the catchment area of the safer provider and into their network.  A reduction of the 
conditions radius may be a viable solution, but more likely elimination of this condition all 
together is more appropriate. No matter what, some providers will be able to offer transportation 
services at a greater frequency than others, and despite prohibitions on advertising, things like 
social media and news stories will create imbalances. The result will be either that more patients 
have access to care, ideally through higher quality faculties, or competitors will be required to 
offer those services to compete, increasing overall access to care. 
 The final condition that poses problems for the safe harbor is the limitation to 
transportation for medically necessary services.  This particular condition may be the one that is 
most at odds with the goals of the ACA and current research on social determinants of health. 
Many, like the OIG, seem to construe the term “access to care” or “health care” as being limited 
to medical care. However, under the ACA these terms are more properly understood as services 
that impact an individual’s overall health, which includes physical, mental, and social well-
being. By limiting the safe harbor to only medical care, the OIG failed to give weight to the 
impact SDH have on health. For example, assume Jane suffers from asthma, one day she is 
having particular difficulty and reaches out to a provider who offers her transportation to an 
appointment.  Jane is given treatment and sent home.  A week later Jane suffers another issue, 
except this time she has to go to the emergency room, where once against she is treated and 
released. It turns out that Jane lives in an older property with poor ventilation which is triggering 
her asthma. Since Jane lacks transportation, and the safe harbor prevents her provider from 
transporting her to anything other than a medically necessary service, she is unable to access a 
social service agency that targets remediation of older homes for the underserved. If the provider 
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was allowed, they could have offered this service early on in their relationship, and reduced 
Jane’s overall expense on the system, regardless of whether the system employed FFS or value-
based payments. Here the tie-in with data collection is important, as it is difficult to track 
whether a provider is using the transportation for the specific service and not just to induce 
referrals without data. Another potential modification would be to expand the definition of 
“medically necessary services” to include those services that are part of the SDH makeup.  Under 
this shift, Jane would be able to use transportation for issues like food and housing only, and 
providers would be required to keep track to reduce fraudulent activity. 
 In addition to the individualized transportation provisions, the safe harbor also adds a 
provision for shuttle services.   OIG included the shuttle provision to help alleviate some of the 
concerns of reduced access, see medically necessary services, through more relaxed conditions.  
In particular, the shuttle service only has five conditions as compared to the individualized’s ten., 
They are: (1) transportation cannot be provided via air, luxury, or ambulance; (2) providers 
cannot market or advertise both the transportation services nor services the provider offers; (3) 
drivers of the transportation service cannot be paid on a per-beneficiary transported basis; (4) 
transportation is limited to a radius of 25 miles in urban settings, 50 miles in rural settings; and 
(5) the provider cannot shift the costs onto Federal Health Care Programs, payors, or 
individuals.193  While each of these conditions has been discussed above, the shuttle represents 
an interesting take on meeting AKS and ACA goals.  Based on the discussion above, it appears 
that the prohibition on advertisement is the largest concern.  Shuttles cannot be a failsafe for the 
rest of the safe harbor, as alone it is inadequate to accomplish the underlying goals of expanded 
access for under-served populations.  Because shuttles also face prohibitions on marketing and 
                                                          
193 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb) (2018). 
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advertising, patients like Jane may never learn about the service. The idea that Jane could simply 
call a provider is problematic, because it puts the cart before the horse.  If Jane doesn’t think she 
can access a provider, why would she call to make an appointment?  
A further problem with the final shuttle service provision is that OIG thinks that the mere 
provision of shuttle services will eliminate many of the access limitations of individualized 
transportation.  Unfortunately, the mere provision of shuttle services does not equate to actual 
utilization.  There is a significant cost-benefit analysis burden placed on providers to determine 
shuttle routes, and how to structure them to create a beneficial program.  If the route selected is 
underutilized, the provider will shut it down, leaving patients where they started.  Rather than 
solely relying on the shuttle services to fill gaps in access, it would make more sense to resolve 
the issues inherent in the individualized transportation addressed above, and leave shuttles as the 
backup strategy. 
VI. Conclusion 
While the Free Transportation Safe Harbor has many provisions that meet the needs of 
both the AKS and ACA, it is in need of modifications to move away from framing in a FFS system 
and incorporate the philosophy and goals of the ACA. Specifically, understanding that as the health 
care system shifts into value-based payments, the increased access to health care services, social 
services, and other “non-traditional” care that are part of the social determinants of health will 
result in less burden to the Federal Health Care Programs and positive health outcomes across the 
country. 
